

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 478

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INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 9203

FROM US REP MBFR

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: TEXT OF UK "THEME" FOR NOV 9, 1973

PLENARY

FOLLOWING IS ADVANCE TEXT OF STATEMENT THAT UK REP WILL DELIVER
AT NOV 8, 1973 PLENARY SESSION. TEXT WAS APPROVED BY AD HOC
GROUP IN ITS NOV 7, 1973 MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT:

STATEMENT BY THE HEAD OF THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION
ON 8 NOVEMBER 1973

IN THIS STATEMENT, MR CHAIRMAN, I WISH TO SET OUT THE VIEWS
OF MY COLLEAGUES AND MYSELF ON WHAT WE SEE AS ONE OF THE
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CRUCIAL ISSUES WITH WHICH OUR NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE CONCERNED.
I REFER TO THE DISPARITIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT
FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND THE GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
BY WHICH THESE DISPARITIES ARE AGGRAVATED. FOR CONVENIENCE

I PROPOSE TO REFER TO THIS WHOLE COMPLEX OF ISSUES AS THE PROBLEM OF DISPARITIES.

BEFORE ONE CAN SPEAK OF DISPARITIES, ONE MUST OF COURSE HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF THE AREA TO WHICH THEY RELATE. IT IS COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL FOCUS ON CENTRAL EUROPE. OF THE STATES WHICH IT HAS ALREADY BEEN AGREED SHOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS BY CONSENSUS, THOSE WHICH HAVE TERRITORY IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS AND POLAND. THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES REMAINS TO BE EXAMINED AND DECIDED. THIS IS A QUESTION TO WHICH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL WISH TO REVERT IN DUE COURSE. THESE ARE THE COUNTRIES WHICH COMPRISE THE AREA ON WHICH OUR NEGOTIATIONS WILL FOCUS. WITHIN THIS AREA ARE STATIONED FORCES OF THE WORLD'S TWO GREATEST MILITARY POWERS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. FORCES FROM BRITAIN AND CANADA ARE ALSO STATIONED IN THIS AREA. ALTHOUGH THEIR NATIONAL TERRITORIES LIE OUTSIDE THE AREA, THESE ARE ALL COUNTRIES WHOSE SECURITY AND WHOSE VITAL INTERESTS ARE CLOSELY AND DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY AND CONCERNED WITH EVENTS IN THE AREA. IT IS TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE AS I HAVE DESCRIBED IT THAT THE DISPARITIES WITH WHICH I AM CONCERNED RELATE.

THAT SUCH DISPARITIES EXIST IS A MATTER OF OBJECTIVE FACT. AS SOON AS ONE LOOKS AT THE AREA WITH WHICH WE ARE CONCERNED, IT BECOMES IMMEDIATELY APPARENT THAT GEOGRAPHY ALONE CONFERS SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES ON THE WARSAW PACT. THE MOST OBVIOUS IS THAT OF THE PROXIMITY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE AREA. WHEREAS THE SOVIET UNION IS DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO CENTRAL EUROPE AND FORMS PART OF THE SAME CONTINENTAL LAND MASS, THE UNITED STATES IS SEPARATED FROM CENTRAL EUROPE BY THE ATLANTIC OCEAN. THE SAME APPLIES TO CANADA. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS A SEA BARRIER BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REST OF EUROPE. THIS BARRIER HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO THE SECURITY OF

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BRITAIN. BY THIS SAME TOKEN, IT CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS MILITARY OBSTACLE TO THE ABILITY OF BRITAIN TO REINFORCE HER TROOPS ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE. MOREOVER, WHILE IT IS LESS THAN 650 KILOMETERS FROM THE SOVIET BORDER TO THE WESTERN BORDER OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, IT IS MORE THAN 5,000 KILOMETERS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE EASTERN BORDER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THESE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NUMEROUS RELATIVELY SECURE OVERLAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO CENTRAL EUROPE, WHILE THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ARE ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON SEA AND AIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION. IT FOLLOWS THAT THE SOVIET

UNION IS MUCH MORE FAVOURABLY PLACED FOR BUILDING UP ITS GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA THAN IS THE CASE FOR THE UNITED STATES.

IN ADDITION TO THE GREAT ADVANTAGE OF PROXIMITY, THE GREAT CONTINUOUS LAND MASS TO THE EAST OF GERMANY GIVES THE SOVIET UNION AN INCOMPARABLY GREATER DEPTH OF TERRITORY THAN IS AVAILABLE TO NATO FORCES ON THE LAND MASS OF EUROPE. THE NATO COUNTRIES, AS A GLANCE AT THE MAP WILL SHOW, ARE CONFINED TO A VERY NARROW AND LIMITED AREA OF LAND BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ON THE EAST AND THE NORTH SEA ON THE WEST.

WHEN WE TURN TO THE QUESTION OF THE SIZE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE DISPARITIES ARE EQUALLY EVIDENT. THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT EASTERN GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA ARE LARGER THAN WESTERN GROUND FORCES. THE DISPARITY IS STILL GREATER BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET FORCES, EVEN WITHOUT TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY OF LARGER SOVIET FORCES IN THE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS OF THE SOVIET UNION. MOREOVER THE WARSAW PACT HAS MORE THAN TWICE AS MANY MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE AREA THAN DOES NATO.

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THE SUPERIOR NUMBERS OF GROUND FORCES MAINTAINED IN THE AREA BY THE WARSAW PACT, AND THE GEOGRAPHICAL ADVANTAGES THEY ENJOY, ARE NOT THE ONLY IMBALANCES WHICH WE REGARD IT AS ESSENTIAL TO

TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO TURN, MR CHAIRMAN, TO CONSIDER THE ELEMENTS OF FORCES WHICH ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES OF ALL WESTERN COUNTRIES REPRESENTED HERE AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THESE ELEMENTS ARE CONCERNED WITH CONSIDERATIONS OF DEPLOYMENT AND CAPABILITY. I HAVE ALREADY DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE DISPARITY IN NUMBERS BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES AND BETWEEN THE TANKS ON EACH SIDE.

THESE DISPARITIES HAVE EXISTED FOR MANY YEARS AND INDEED IN RECENT YEARS THEY HAVE BEEN ACCENTUATED. THERE HAS BEEN A GRADUAL INCREASE IN THE STRENGTH, PARTICULARLY IN THE ARMOURED STRENGHT, OF THE GROUND
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FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BOTH OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OF THE OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. MOREOVER THERE IS A LARGE CONCENTRATION OF ARMOURED AND MECHANISED FORMATIONS IN THAT PART OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TO THE WEST OF BERLIN. THE TOTAL STRENGHT OF ARMOURED FORMATIONS INVOLVED ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE FAR EXCEEDS THAT OF NATO FORMATIONS IN THE COMPARABLE AREA ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE EAST-WEST GERMAN BORDER. I SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT I AM IN NO WAY PASSING A JUDGEMENT ON WARSAW PACT INTENTIONS WHEN I SAY THAT, IN STRICTLY MILITARY TERMS, THIS PARTICULAR COMBINATION OF ARMOUR AND DEPLOYMENT REPRESENTS A MAJOR MILITARY CAPABILITY WHICH CAUSES US CONCERN. THIS IS NOT A POLITICAL ASSESSMENT; IT IS A MILITARY FACT. THIS CAPABILITY HAS NO COUNTERPART ON THE WESTERN SIDE, WHERE THE CHARACTER AND DEPLOYMENT OF OUR GROUND FORCES GIVES THEM A MILITARY CAPABILITY WHICH IS SUITABLE ONLY FOR A DEFENSIVE ROLE. THIS CAPABILITY ON THE EASTERN SIDE IS INEVITABLY OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO US AND TO ALL OUR ALLIES, AND IS A FACTOR WHICH CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED IN DETERMINING THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT FOR WHICH WE SHOULD AIM.

MOREOVER, THERE IS AN INTERACTION AMONG THE FACTORS I HAVE MENTIONED. THE LACK OF DEPTH IN THE TERRITORY BETWEEN THE WESTERN BORDER OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE NORTH SEA COMBINED WITH THE CHARACTER OF THE TERRAIN IN THE NORTHERN PART OF CENTRAL EUROPE, ENHANCES THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF ARMOUR OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. THUS OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTS AND OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES AND THEIR DEPLOYMENT COMPOUND EACH OTHER.

I HAVE DWELT AT THIS LENGTH ON THE PROBLEM OF
DISPARITIES BECAUSE I WANT TO LEAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT
THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE AND OUR ALLIES ATTACH TO IT.
AS AMBASSADOR QUARLES STATED ON 6 NOVEMBER THE
PRINCIPAL AIM OF OUR GOVERNMENTS IN THESE
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NEGOTIATIONS IS TO ACHIEVE A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP
AT A LOWER LEVEL OF FORCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. INDEED
AS I SAID IN MY OPENING STATEMENT ON 31 OCTOBER, OUR
WORK WOULD BE SELF-DEFEATING AND INDEED DANGEROUS
IF, AT THE END OF IT ALL, THE MILITARY SITUATION WAS
LESS STABLE THAN IT IS TODAY. ALL THE COUNTRIES
PARTICIPATING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE SUBSCRIBED
TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS TO BE WORKED
OUT "WILL IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM
TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH
PARTY". BUT AN AGREEMENT WHICH WE WOULD REGARD AS
PRESERVING OUR SECURITY UNDIMINISHED WILL NEED TO
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DISPARITIES - BOTH OF GEOGRAPHY
AND OF FORCES - TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED. THESE
DISPARITIES FAVOUR THE WARSAW PACT AND AN AGREEMENT
WHICH AGGRAVATED THEM WOULD THUS CLEARLY DIMINISH
OUR SECURITY.

INDEED THE NATURE OF THE NUMERICAL AND
GEOGRAPHICAL DISPARITIES IS SUCH THAT SIMPLY TO
PRESERVE THEM AT A LOWER LEVEL OF FORCES WOULD
INEVITABLY BE TO INCREASE STILL FURTHER THE
ADVANTAGE TO THE WARSAW PACT. IF ONE SIDE HAS A
CURRENT ADVANTAGE IN TANKS AND MANPOWER, AS WELL
AS IN GEOGRAPHY, THESE ADVANTAGES WOULD BECOME
INTENSIFIED IF THE PRESENT FORCE LEVEL WERE REDUCED
IN A MECHANICAL WAY WITHOUT HAVING REGARD TO THE
DISPARITIES. FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE WESTERN SIDE, A
LOWER NUMBER OF FORCES WOULD BE STRETCHED OVER THE
SAME TERRAIN OPPOSITE FORCES WHICH WOULD STILL
RETAIN AN IMPORTANT ADVANTAGE IN MANPOWER AND ARMOUR.
THIS WOULD NOT FULFIL THE OTHER IMPORTANT ESSENTIAL
PRINCIPLE AGREED DURING THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS
AND WHICH IS INDEED CENTRAL TO THE BASIC OBJECTIVES
OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, NAMELY THE CREATION OF "A MORE
STABLE RELATIONSHIP" AND THUS "THE STRENGTHENING OF
PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE". IT IS CONSEQUENTLY
OUR FIRM CONVICTION THAT ANY FORCE REDUCTIONS ON
WHICH WE AGREE MUST ELIMINATE OR NEUTRALISE THE
DISPARITIES RESULT IN A MORE STABLE BALANCE
BETWEEN THE FORCES ON EITHER SIDE, ACCOMPANIED BY
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MEASURES WHICH TAKE THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND OTHER
CONAI HAVE OUTLINED FULLY INTO ACCOUNT.
OUR VIEWS ON THESE WILL BE DESCRIBED IN A LATER
STATEMENT. IN THIS WAY, NOT ONLY WILL THERE BE
UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL CONCERNED, BUT THE
STABILITY OF THE WHOLE OF EUROPE WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY
ENHANCED.

IN CONCLUSION, MR. CHAIRMAN, I SHOULD LIKE TO
SUMMARISE BRIEFLY THE MAIN POINTS WHICH I HAVE SOUGHT
TO DEVELOP. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM OF
DISPARITIES IS CENTRAL TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THESE
DISPARITIES ARE DISPARITIES OF GEOGRAPHY, OF SIZE OF
GROUND FORCES, OF THE CHARACTER OF THOSE FORCES AND
OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT. THEY ARE DISPARITIES WHICH
RELATE TO THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA WHICH HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY
ALL GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED HERE TODAY AS BEING THE FOCUS
OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THEIR EXISTENCE IS A MATTER OF OBJECTIVE
FACT. IT IS EQUALLY A FACT, AND ONE WHICH IN NO WAY DERIVES
FROM ANY JUDGMENT OF THE INTENTIONS OF EITHER SIDE, THAT THEY
ARE DISPARITIES WHICH MAKE FOR INSTABILITY. WE BELIEVE THEREFORE
THAT AN AGREEMENT WHICH SIMPLY PRESERVED THESE DISPARITIES INEVITABLY
ENHANCE THE ADVANTAGES
ALREADY ENJOYED BY THE WARSAW PACT AND INTENSIFY THE INSTABILITIES
INHERENT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. OUR AIM MUST THEREFORE BE
TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT WHICH TAKES THESE DISPARITIES FULLY
INTO ACCOUNT AND WHICH SO FAR AS POSSIBLE ELIMINATES OR
NEUTRALISES THEM. AN AGREEMENT ON THESE LINES WOULD STRENGTHEN
THE SECURITY OF ALL CONCERNED AND WOULD BE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION
TO "A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP IN EUROPE." END TEXT. HUMES

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